

Muslim–Non-Muslim Relations in Conflict and Peace: A *Tafsīr Maqāsidī* Reading and its Implications For Plural Citizenship



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Abstract: This article examines Muslim–non-Muslim relations through a *maqāsidī* reading of Qur'ān 4:144, 60:1 and 60:8–9, 49:13, and 5:8. Its central concern is the tendency to generalize verses governing loyalty under conditions of threat and conflict into a universal prohibition on relations with non-Muslims within a shared civic order. This library-based study employs Abdul Mustaqim's thematic-*maqāsidī* method. The analysis establishes the textual corpus, examines interverse relations (*munāsabah*) and historical contexts, analyzes key terms, compares classical, modern, and Indonesian commentaries, constructs an intratextual synthesis, and maps both protective and productive objectives. The findings show that Qur'ān 4:144 and 60:1 regulate forms of loyalty that may endanger communal security during active hostility; they do not prohibit all social relations with non-Muslims. Qur'ān 60:8–9 restricts the prohibition to parties engaged in aggression and expulsion, whereas Qur'ān 49:13 and 5:8 affirm recognition of diversity and justice, including toward groups one may dislike. From a *maqāsidī* perspective, this synthesis supports the protection of religious freedom, life, public reason, intergenerational social continuity, equitable economic access, and a constitutional political order. The study thus shifts majority–minority relations from the language of unilateral tolerance toward equal citizenship without eliminating legitimate vigilance against aggression and betrayal.

Keywords: Muslim–non-Muslim relations; *tafsīr maqāsidī*; loyalty; justice; citizenship

Abstrak: Artikel ini menganalisis relasi Muslim dan non-Muslim melalui pembacaan tafsir *maqāsidī* atas QS al-Nisā' [4]:144, QS al-Mumtahanah [60]:1 dan 8–9, QS al-Hujurat [49]:13, serta QS al-Mā'idah [5]:8. Masalah utama penelitian ialah kecenderungan menggeneralisasi ayat-ayat loyalitas yang turun dalam situasi ancaman dan konflik menjadi larangan universal berhubungan dengan non-Muslim dalam masyarakat kewarganegaraan. Penelitian kepustakaan ini menggunakan metode tafsir tematik-*maqāsidī* Abdul Mustaqim. Analisis dilakukan melalui penetapan korpus, pembacaan *munāsabah* dan konteks historis, analisis istilah kunci, perbandingan tafsir klasik, modern, dan Indonesia, sintesis intratekstual, serta pemetaan tujuan protektif dan produktif. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa QS al-Nisā' [4]:144 dan QS al-Mumtahanah [60]:1 mengatur loyalitas yang berisiko merusak keamanan komunitas dalam konteks permusuhan, bukan melarang seluruh hubungan sosial dengan non-Muslim. QS al-Mumtahanah [60]:8–9 membatasi larangan tersebut pada pihak yang memerangi dan mengusir, sedangkan QS al-Hujurat [49]:13 dan QS al-Mā'idah [5]:8 menegaskan pengakuan atas keragaman dan keadilan, termasuk terhadap kelompok yang tidak disukai. Secara *maqāsidī*, sintesis ayat-ayat tersebut menghasilkan perlindungan kebebasan beragama, jiwa, akal publik, keberlanjutan sosial antargenerasi, akses ekonomi yang adil, dan tata negara konstitusional. Temuan ini menggeser hubungan mayoritas-minoritas dari bahasa toleransi sepihak menuju kesetaraan kewarganegaraan, tanpa menghapus kewaspadaan yang sah terhadap agresi dan pengkhianatan.

Kata Kunci: relasi Muslim–non-Muslim; tafsir *maqāsidī*; loyalitas; keadilan; kewarganegaraan

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Introduction

Qur'ānic verses concerning relations across communal boundaries present two clusters of teachings that may initially appear to be in tension. On the one hand, some verses prohibit believers from extending loyalty to parties that are hostile to and threaten the Muslim community. On the other hand, the Qur'ān commands justice, recognition of diversity, and benevolent relations with those who do not engage in aggression. The scholarly task is not to select one cluster and ignore the other, but to explain how verses revealed in contexts of conflict should be read together with verses on justice and peaceful relations, so that their normative message is not indiscriminately transferred into the context of modern citizenship.

This article distinguishes social polarization from discrimination, intolerance, and conflict. Polarization refers to a process in which distance between groups widens, internal identities become increasingly homogeneous, and the other is perceived as a threatening pole. Discrimination is unequal treatment; intolerance is the rejection of another group's existence or rights; and conflict is a clash of interests that may occur without necessarily producing permanent polarization.¹ This distinction matters because not every instance of discrimination involves two comparably opposed poles, and not every disagreement develops into polarization.

The terms majority and minority are likewise not treated as direct equivalents of Muslim and non-Muslim. Majority–minority status may refer to population size, access to power, cultural dominance, legal status, or control over resources. A group that is a national majority may be a local minority, and vice versa. This article uses the terms only as analytical categories for examining civic relations based on religious identity in situations where one group occupies a more dominant social and political position than another.² With this limitation, Qur'ānic categories such as *al-mu'minūn*, *al-kāfirūn*, *'aduww*, *shu'ūb*, and *qabā'il* are not automatically equated with modern demographic categories.

In this study, Indonesia is understood as a constitutional state that recognizes religious plurality and guarantees freedom of religion, rather than being reduced to a binary opposition between a religious state and a secular state. The relevance of the verses is therefore assessed not by their capacity to justify the dominance of one community, but by their contribution to justice, security, legal equality, and the protection of citizens' rights.³

This article does not treat particular cases, sermons, fatwas, or social-media posts as empirical evidence of the misuse of verses. It advances a more limited claim: Qur'ān 4:144

¹ Rachmad Gustomy, "Pandemi ke Infodemi: Polarisasi Politik dalam Wacana Covid-19 Pengguna Twitter," *JlIP: Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pemerintahan* 5, no. 2 (2020): 190–205; Bachtiar Nur Budiman, "Populisme di Indonesia sebagai Ancaman Polarisasi Masyarakat," *Pancasila: Jurnal Keindonesiaan* 1, no. 2 (2021): 235–46; Hema Junaice Sitorus, Mellysa Tanoyo, and Irwansyah, "Polarisasi Politik melalui Interaksi Sosial di Instagram: Studi Kasus Pemilu 2024 di Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi dan Media Sosial* 4, no. 2 (2024): 383–94.

² Nayla Syafaah and Theguh Saumantri, "Memahami Kekerasan terhadap Kelompok Minoritas dalam Konteks Kerukunan Beragama," *SETYAKI: Jurnal Studi Keagamaan Islam* 2, no. 1 (2024): 10–18; Wasisto Raharjo Jati, "Relasi Antar Umat Mayoritas dan Minoritas: Studi Masyarakat Tionghoa di Surabaya," *Harmoni* 20, no. 2 (2021): 276–92; Yeni Wijayanti, "Kedudukan Etnis Tionghoa dalam Multikulturalisme Indonesia: Antara Harapan dan Kenyataan," *Jurnal Artefak* 9, no. 2 (2022): 139–48.

³ Roro Fatikhin, "Keadilan Sosial dalam Perspektif al-Qur'ān dan Pancasila," *Panangkaran: Jurnal Penelitian Agama dan Masyarakat* 1, no. 2 (2017): 300–302.

and 60:1 are vulnerable to overgeneralization when their contexts of conflict, the structure of their respective sūrahs, and their relationship to verses on peaceful relations are ignored. The study therefore focuses on a hermeneutical problem rather than empirically measuring how frequently particular groups invoke these verses.

Previous scholarship may be grouped into three broad tendencies. First, studies of political and social polarization emphasize populism, digital interaction, labeling, and the formation of identity blocs. These studies show that polarization is not merely difference, but a process through which political or social opponents are transformed into moral threats.⁴ Second, studies of minority groups in Indonesia address violence, the position of citizens of Chinese descent, and unequal recognition within a multicultural society.⁵ Third, scholarship on Islam and intergroup relations discusses interreligious dialogue, Sunnī–Shī‘ī conflict, and polarization among Muslim groups. These bodies of research, however, have not specifically developed an intratextual synthesis between verses on loyalty in conflict and verses on justice in peaceful relations through the framework of *maqāṣidī* exegesis.

The originality of this study lies in three respects. First, it does not read Qur‘ān 4:144 and 60:1 in isolation, but relates them to Qur‘ān 60:8–9, 49:13, and 5:8. Second, the meaning of *awliyā‘* is not determined by a single translation, but examined through its semantic field of proximity, protection, alliance, and loyalty within the context of each verse. Third, the interpretive results are mapped into protective and productive dimensions of the *maqāṣid*, thereby moving beyond moral exhortations to tolerance toward equal citizenship.

On this basis, the study poses two questions. First, how should the contexts, key terms, and interrelationships among Qur‘ān 4:144, 60:1 and 60:8–9, 49:13, and 5:8 be understood through *maqāṣidī* exegesis? Second, what implications does this synthesis have for Muslim–non-Muslim relations in a plural civic society? The article’s central argument is that prohibitions concerning loyalty in conflict verses function as means of protecting a community from aggression and betrayal, whereas their broader purposes are justice, security, and human dignity. Religious difference, therefore, cannot by itself justify the elimination of social relations, political rights, or civic equality.

Method

This is a qualitative, library-based study employing a thematic-*maqāṣidī* method of exegesis.⁶ Its material object consists of verses regulating loyalty, hostility, diversity, and justice in intergroup relations. Its formal object is Abdul Mustaqim’s *maqāṣidī* exegesis, particularly the principles of collecting thematically related verses, attending to internal and external contexts, conducting linguistic analysis, distinguishing means from ends, and

⁴ Gustomy, “Pandemi ke Infodemi,” 190–205; Budiman, “Populisme di Indonesia,” 235–46; Romel Masykuri and Mohammad Fajar Shodiq Ramadlan, “Analisis Manifestasi Segregasi Politik, Pelabelan, dan Polarisasi di antara Kelompok Islam Sepanjang 2014–2019,” *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 12, no. 1 (2021): 68–87.

⁵ Jati, “Relasi Antar Umat Mayoritas dan Minoritas,” 276–92; Wijayanti, “Kedudukan Etnis Tionghoa,” 139–48; M. Khusna Amal and Ahmad Fajar Shodiq, “Konflik Sunnī–Shī‘ah di Indonesia Kontemporer: Polarisasi, Diskriminasi, dan Kekerasan Agama,” *Islamika Inside* 5, no. 2 (2019): 208–37.

⁶ Mestika Zed, *Metode Penelitian Kepustakaan* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2008), 1.

mapping the maqāṣid in their protective (min ḥayth al-‘adam) and productive (min ḥayth al-wujūd) dimensions.⁷

The primary corpus comprises Qur‘ān 4:144, 60:1 and 60:8–9, 49:13, and 5:8. Qur‘ān 2:256 serves as a supporting verse concerning the prohibition of religious coercion. These verses were selected because they represent three relational fields: hostility and the risk of betrayal; relations with parties that do not wage war; and universal principles of diversity and justice. The corpus is not intended as an exhaustive list of all verses concerning non-Muslims, but as an analytical unit that permits close and intratextual reading.

No.	Verse	Primary Focus	Analytical Function
1	Qur‘ān 4:144 (al-Nisā’)	Loyalty within the passage on hypocrisy	Tests the meaning of awliyā’ and the limits of loyalty that endangers the community
2	Qur‘ān 60:1, 8–9 (al-Mumtaḥanah)	Hostility, expulsion, and nonaggression	Distinguishes enemies defined by aggressive conduct from religiously different parties that do not wage war
3	Qur‘ān 49:13 (al-Hujurāt)	Diversity and ta‘āruf	Constructs a basis for recognition and the rejection of identity-based superiority
4	Qur‘ān 5:8 (al-Mā'idah)	Justice amid hatred	Establishes justice as a universal norm for intergroup relations
5	Qur‘ān 2:256 (al-Baqarah)	Prohibition of religious coercion	Strengthens religious freedom as an implication of citizenship

Table 1. Qur‘ānic Corpus and Analytical Functions

Exegetical sources were selected to represent different periods and orientations. Al-Ṭabarī, Ibn Kathīr, al-Qurṭubī, and al-Shawkānī represent the classical and premodern traditions; Wahbah al-Zuhaylī and Sayyid Quṭb represent modern Arabic exegesis; while Hamka, M. Quraish Shihab, and the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Al-Qur‘ān dan Tafsirnya represent the Indonesian context. Arabic editions of the principal works were used to verify terminology, whereas Indonesian translations were cited when providing page references accessible to Indonesian readers.⁸

The analysis proceeded in eight stages. First, it defined the key terms and delimited the corpus. Second, it examined the munāṣabah of each verse within its sūrah. Third, it investigated relevant occasions of revelation and socio-political contexts. Fourth, it analyzed the terms awliyā’, ‘aduww, mawaddah, shu‘ūb, qabā’il, ta‘ārafū, qawwāmīn, and i‘dīlū. Fifth, it compared classical, modern, and Indonesian interpretations. Sixth, it constructed a synthesis

⁷ Abdul Mustaqim, “Argumentasi Keniscayaan Tafsir Maqāṣidī sebagai Basis Moderasi Islam” (inaugural professorial address, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2019), 32, 39–41; Waṣfī ‘Ashūr Abū Zayd, *Metode Tafsir Maqāṣidī*, trans. Ulya Fikriyati (Jakarta: Qaf Media Kreativa, 2020), 20.

⁸ See the Arabic editions used to verify the text: Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi‘ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur‘ān*, ed. ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī (Cairo: Dār Hajr, 2001); Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmi‘ li-Aḥkām al-Qur‘ān* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1964); Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Umar Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān al-‘Azīm*, ed. Sāmī ibn Muḥammad Salāmah (Riyadh: Dār Ṭaybah, 1999); Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Shawkānī, *Fatḥ al-Qadīr* (Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1994); and Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, *al-Tafsīr al-Munīr fī al-‘Aqīdah wa-al-Sharī‘ah wa-al-Manhaj* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2009).

among verses on conflict, nonaggression, diversity, and justice. Seventh, it identified the purposes of the verses by distinguishing temporally conditioned means from broader moral ends. Eighth, it mapped the protective and productive implications for civic relations.

Interpretive validity was maintained in three ways. First, every conclusion had to be traceable to the wording of the verses, their contexts, and the commentaries under comparison. Second, reports concerning the occasions of revelation were used cautiously to illuminate context rather than as the sole determinant of meaning. Third, unverifiable historical claims—such as specific assertions about offices held by non-Muslim figures in classical bureaucracies—were not used as foundations for the argument. The study is limited to textual analysis and does not measure the practical use of these verses in sermons, social media, or political movements.

Results and Discussion

Abdul Mustaqim's *Maqāṣidī* Exegesis as an Analytical Framework

Abdul Mustaqim presents *maqāṣidī* exegesis as an approach that seeks to identify the purposes of the Qur'ān by balancing text and context, transmitted evidence and reason, and individual, social, and universal welfare. In this model, the *uṣūl al-khamsah*—the protection of religion, life, intellect, progeny, and property—are expanded to include protection of the state and the environment. Such expansion, however, does not mean that every *maqṣad* must be imposed on every subject. The relevance of each objective must be derived from the verses, their contexts, and the social problem under examination.

This study applies four principal elements of that framework. First, thematically related verses are read collectively so that one verse is not used to negate another. Second, terms and historical contexts are analyzed before contemporary applications are proposed. Third, prohibitions and commands are read through the distinction between *wasīlah* and *ghāyah*: a particular form of loyalty may be prohibited as a means of preventing harm, while its ultimate purposes are security, justice, and social continuity. Fourth, the *maqāṣid* are mapped in protective and productive terms. The protective dimension prevents violence, discrimination, and the deprivation of rights; the productive dimension builds dialogue, equality, literacy, and just institutions.

This framework also prevents *ḥifẓ al-dawlah* from being used to justify stability without justice. In a *maqāṣidī* reading, the state is not an end that stands above citizens' rights, but a legitimate institution insofar as it protects religion, life, intellect, family, property, and the dignity of all inhabitants. National cohesion is therefore measured not by the absence of criticism, but by the capacity of the public order to manage difference justly.

The Qur'ānic Corpus and Relational Fields

The Qur'ān does not employ “majority” and “minority” as technical terms of modern social science. The verses examined here speak of believers, unbelievers, enemies, those who expel others, tribes, peoples, and groups that are objects of hatred. The majority–minority distinction is therefore used at the level of application, not as a substitute for Qur'ānic vocabulary.

Intergroup relations in the corpus may be divided into three fields. First is active hostility, in which a party wages war, expels others, leaks information, or threatens communal security. Second is treaty-based and nonaggressive relations, in which religious difference is not accompanied by attack or expulsion. Third is shared citizenship, namely relations within a legal order that accords civic status to different groups. This threefold division is more adequate than a simple opposition between “war” and “peace,” because social reality may include tension, treaties, nonaggression, cooperation, and legal conflict without open warfare.

Verses on Loyalty in Contexts of Conflict

Qur‘ān 4:144: Loyalty, Hypocrisy, and Communal Security

Qur‘ān 4:144 prohibits believers from taking *al-kāfirīn* as *awliyā‘* in place of fellow believers. The verse appears within Qur‘ān 4:137–146, a passage concerning those who repeatedly shift their professions of faith, the vacillation of hypocrites, the search for honor among parties perceived as stronger, and attempts to profit from two communities in confrontation. The verse’s *munāsabah* therefore shows that the prohibition is not an abstract statement about non-Muslim identity. Its focus is opportunistic loyalty that sacrifices communal trust, subordinates collective security to personal interest, and seeks protection from an opposing party while abandoning previously agreed public bonds.

Locating the verse within the discussion of hypocrisy also shifts the analytical focus from the identity of the external party to the moral quality of the person extending loyalty. The issue is not merely who is taken as a *walī*, but why that loyalty is given, whose interests it serves, and what harm it may produce. A person of another religion is not automatically an enemy, just as a coreligionist is not automatically immune from betrayal. The structure of the verse thus directs judgment toward actions, motives, commitments, and political consequences rather than treating religious identity as the sole criterion.

The root *w-l-y* conveys proximity, connection, uninterrupted succession, and support. In socio-political usage, *awliyā‘* may denote protectors, allies, patrons, helpers, or parties to whom loyalty is rendered. Wahbah al-Zuhaylī emphasizes the prohibition on taking hostile parties as allies and disclosing to them secrets that endanger believers. Hamka translates the term as “leaders,” but this choice represents a contextual application of one function of *wilāyah* rather than a single lexical meaning applicable to every occurrence of the term.⁹ Because its semantic field is broad, the interpreter must first determine the relation addressed by the verse: social intimacy, security protection, political alliance, delegation of authority, or support for an actively hostile party.

The phrase *min dūni al-mu‘minīn* clarifies that the prohibition concerns abandoning responsibility toward one’s own community. It is not a command to sever every interreligious social network, but a critique of transferring loyalty in a manner that nullifies moral and political obligations to those bound within a shared community. A contextual reading must

⁹ Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, *Tafsīr al-Munīr*, trans. Abdul Hayyie al-Kattani, vol. 3 (Jakarta: Gema Insani, 2013), 327; Hamka, *Tafsīr al-Azhar*, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1983), 1483–84.

therefore distinguish historical meaning, ethical value, and contemporary application; the application cannot be treated as the verse's only meaning.¹⁰

From a *maqāṣidī* perspective, the prohibition functions as a *wasīlah* for protecting life, security, and communal continuity from sabotage and betrayal. The verse does not aim to create permanent religious segregation. If religious identity becomes the sole indicator of loyalty, the verse may be used to disregard non-Muslims who remain faithful to public covenants while concealing betrayal by coreligionists. Such a reading conflicts with the principle of justice, which evaluates persons according to their conduct and responsibilities.

Qur'ān 4:144 is therefore insufficient as a stand-alone proof for prohibiting every public office or social relationship involving non-Muslims. In a civic state, public loyalty is institutionalized through a constitution, oaths of office, law, oversight mechanisms, and accountability. Relevant criteria include competence, integrity, fidelity to the legal order, openness to scrutiny, and evidence of conduct that may harm collective security. This conclusion does not remove the verse's concern with betrayal; rather, it shifts the criterion from static identity to demonstrable action. Contemporary scholarship on Muslim–non-Muslim equality likewise shows that atomistic readings of loyalty verses must be controlled by the full range of Qur'ānic evidence on equality, covenants, and justice.¹¹

Qur'ān 60:1 and 60:8–9: Enmity, Affection, and the Limits of Prohibition

Qur'ān 60:1 prohibits believers from taking “My enemy and your enemy” as *awliyā'* and secretly conveying information to them out of *mawaddah*. The widely cited occasion of revelation associates the verse with Ḥaṭīb ibn Abī Balta'ah, who sent information about the planned liberation of Mecca to Quraysh. Ibn Kathīr and Hamka situate the prohibition within the disclosure of strategic secrets to a party engaged in hostility.¹² The report is significant not because it confines the verse to a single event, but because it identifies the type of conduct at the center of the prohibition: transmitting information that could undermine communal protection and assist an aggressor.

The object of the prohibition is defined by the phrase *'aduwwī wa 'aduwwakum*. The Qur'ān does not refer only to religious difference; it identifies concrete actions: rejection of the truth, expulsion of the Messenger, expulsion of believers, and forcing the community from its homes. The category of “enemy” is therefore relational and action-based. Religious difference alone does not make a person an *'aduww*; hostility is constituted through aggression, expulsion, treaty violation, or material assistance to such acts.

The term *mawaddah* reveals the verse's moral complexity. Ḥaṭīb is not portrayed simply as someone who hated the Muslim community, but as someone who allowed family interests and personal attachment to override a security trust. The verse therefore does not negate affection as a human value. It restricts the expression of affection when that expression becomes a means of enabling aggression, violating a covenant, or endangering those entitled

¹⁰ Abdullah Saeed, *Interpreting the Qur'ān: Towards a Contemporary Approach* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 116–25, 149–52.

¹¹ Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam* (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2002), 79–97.

¹² Ibn Kathīr, *Lubāb al-Tafsīr min Ibn Kathīr*, trans. M. Abdul Ghoffar E.M. and Abu Ihsan al-Atsari, vol. 8 (Bogor: Pustaka Imam al-Syafi'i, 2004), 133–36; Hamka, *Tafsīr al-Azhar*, vol. 9, 7291–92.

to protection. Distinguishing emotion, social relationships, and political conduct is essential if the verse is not to be transformed into a prohibition on every form of interreligious friendship.

The intratextual reading becomes clearest through Qurʾān 60:8–9. Verse 8 states that God does not forbid believers from acting benevolently (*tabarrūhum*) and justly (*tuqsiṭū ilayhim*) toward those who neither fight them because of religion nor expel them from their homes. Verse 9 restricts the prohibition to those who fight, expel, or assist in expulsion. Al-Shawkānī, al-Qurṭubī, and M. Quraish Shihab underscore the distinction between aggressors and parties who live without hostility.¹³ The two verbs in verse 8 also show that peaceful relations are not formulated minimally. *Birr* denotes substantive benevolence, while *qisṭ* requires justice that can be measured in treatment and the allocation of rights.

Reading verse 1 together with verses 8–9 establishes an internal mechanism that controls overgeneralization. Verse 1 cannot be detached from the limits provided by verses 8–9, just as verse 8 cannot be used to disregard vigilance toward aggression. The result is not a simple binary of war and peace, but a spectrum of relations: active aggression, assistance in expulsion, treaty violation, nonaggression, social relations, and public cooperation. Each category requires a distinct response based on conduct and risk rather than a single response based on religion.

From a *maqāsidī* perspective, these verses combine protection with openness. Their protective dimension prevents sabotage, espionage, expulsion, and support for aggression. Their productive dimension builds *birr*, justice, reliable covenants, and social relations not governed by suspicion. Kamali argues that Qurʾānic evidence concerning non-Muslims must be read as a whole; verses revealed in conditions of conflict cannot cancel evidence supporting benevolence, protection, and equality in nonaggressive relations.¹⁴

For contemporary societies, this entails distinguishing national security from identity-based exclusion. The state may legitimately prevent espionage, violence, and assistance to aggressors, but such measures must be established through law and applied to all citizens regardless of religion. Conversely, the state may not treat an entire religious community as a latent threat. Contextual interpretation requires norms revealed in conflict to be transferred to a new setting only after the underlying structure of conduct and moral purpose has been identified, not merely because group labels appear similar.¹⁵

Diversity, Justice, and Noncoercion

Qurʾān 49:13: Diversity and *Taʾaruf*

Qurʾān 49:13 begins with the universal address *yā ayyuhā al-nās* rather than addressing only the community of believers. It then links all human beings to a common origin and recognizes the existence of *shuʿūb* and *qabāʾil* so that they may know one another. Al-Shawkānī explains the two terms as layers of genealogical communities, while the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs' commentary relates them to social relations that are

¹³ Al-Shawkānī, *Tafsīr Faṭḥ al-Qadīr*, trans. Amir Hamzah Fachruddin and Asep Saefullah, vol. 11 (Jakarta: Pustaka Azzam, 2008), 259; al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, trans. Fathurrahman Abdul Hamid, vol. 18 (Jakarta: Pustaka Azzam, 2015), 347; M. Quraish Shihab, *Tafsīr al-Mishbah*, vol. 14 (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2002), 168–70.

¹⁴ Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam*, 81–97, 107–15.

¹⁵ Saeed, *Interpreting the Qurʾān*, 149–52.

not founded on identity-based arrogance.¹⁶ This sequence is significant: shared humanity is affirmed before group diversity, so difference cannot sever the basic dignity held in common.

The verse does not speak directly of “polarization” as a term of modern social science. It nevertheless provides a normative logic for correcting the mechanisms that generate polarization. First, difference belongs to the structure of creation rather than constituting a failure to be erased. Second, group identity serves recognition and social organization rather than legitimizing human hierarchy. Third, diversity is directed by the verb *lita’ārafū*, which denotes a reciprocal process. It is not sufficient for one group merely to know another as an object; both are required to build forms of knowledge capable of correcting prejudice.

Ta’āruf means more than symbolic encounter or momentary cordiality. Its morphological form implies reciprocity: each party recognizes and is willing to be recognized. Its application therefore requires relatively equal communicative space, access to articulate experience, willingness to hear another party’s suffering, and mechanisms for correcting false representations. In majority–minority relations, *ta’āruf* fails when the dominant group monopolizes the definition of the minority without allowing that community to describe itself.

The concluding phrase, *inna akramakum ’inda Allāhi atqākum*, likewise cannot be used to replace racial hierarchy with a new social hierarchy claimed in the name of piety. The verse places the assessment of piety with God and closes by affirming two divine attributes of knowledge. Because human access to inner states is limited, no group may transform a theological claim to superiority into an automatic right to dominate law, economics, or politics. Piety functions as a moral correction to arrogance, not as a social certificate that a majority group can manufacture.

The verse contributes three principles to citizenship. First, civic dignity is not derived from the numerical size of a group. Second, identity should be managed for recognition and cooperation rather than used to block social mobility. Third, difference of belief does not erase a person’s right to speak, be heard, and participate. Scholarship on equality in Islam shows that a comprehensive reading of Qur’ānic sources supports basic dignity and just treatment for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, while historical inequalities must be read in relation to the socio-political conditions that shaped them.¹⁷

Within a *maqāsidī* framework, *ta’āruf* has both protective and productive dimensions. Protectively, it prevents dehumanization, stereotyping, and the intergenerational transmission of hatred. Productively, it requires intergroup education, fair representation, and cooperation on common concerns. Qur’ān 49:13 thus becomes more than a slogan of diversity; it provides a basis for assessing whether social institutions genuinely enable mutual recognition.

Qur’ān 5:8 : Justice toward Disliked Groups

Qur’ān 5:8 commands believers to be *qawwāmīn lillāh* and witnesses with justice, and then forbids hatred of a people from leading to injustice. Sayyid Quṭb emphasizes justice unaffected by love or hatred, while M. Quraish Shihab presents justice as the disposition

¹⁶ Al-Shawkānī, *Tafsīr Fath al-Qadīr*, vol. 10, 492–95; Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, *Al-Qur’ān dan Tafsirnya*, vol. 9 (Jakarta: Widya Cahaya, 2011), 419–21.

¹⁷ Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam*, 79–97.

closest to piety.¹⁸ The intensive form *qawwāmīn* requires the continuous and active establishment of justice; justice is not merely a benevolent sentiment but a moral and institutional discipline.

The verse makes hatred a test of justice. Justice extended only to one's own group does not yet demonstrate ethical commitment, because it may arise from group solidarity. The real test occurs when the rights of a disliked party must still be recognized. The phrase *lā yajrimannakum shana'ānu qawmin 'alā allā ta'dilū* therefore prohibits collective emotion from becoming a basis for diminishing rights, ignoring evidence, or imposing punishment without due process.

This norm has direct implications for majority–minority relations. In law, religious identity must not alter standards of evidence or protection. In public services, dislike must not restrict access to education, employment, administrative documents, or security. In politics, groups viewed as oppositional retain the right to express opinions and scrutinize power so long as they do not engage in violence. Kamali cites Qur'ān 5:8 and 60:8 as evidence that Qur'ānic justice transcends race, community, and religion.¹⁹

The justice commanded by the verse should also be distinguished into procedural, corrective, and distributive dimensions. Procedural justice requires equal rules, an opportunity to present a defense, and decisions based on evidence. Corrective justice requires remedy when a group has been harmed by violence or policy. Distributive justice asks whether social burdens and benefits are allocated without using religious identity as a ground for exclusion. These dimensions show that *i'dilū* cannot remain a matter of personal intention; it must be translated into verifiable procedures and institutions.²⁰

Justice is more demanding than tolerance. Tolerance may stop at a majority's willingness to "allow" a minority to exist, whereas justice requires equal rules, active protection, and correction of structures that systematically produce disadvantage. Moderation, therefore, cannot be reduced to calls for disadvantaged groups to remain restrained. It becomes meaningful only when holders of authority are willing to reform unjust policies, procedures, and distributions of resources.

The verse also places limits on group loyalty. Defending one's own community may not override facts and justice. Loyalty to religion, nation, organization, or leader loses legitimacy when it demands concealment of wrongdoing. In *maqāṣidī* terms, justice is the *ghāyah* that regulates political *wasā'il*. Stability, solidarity, and security are legitimate only insofar as they are not used to conceal oppression. Modern constitutional arrangements may be understood as institutional means for safeguarding this demand through the separation of powers, courts, and guarantees of citizens' rights.²¹

¹⁸ Sayyid Qutb, *Tafsīr Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān*, trans. As'ad Yasin, vol. 3 (Jakarta: Gema Insani, 2004), 182; M. Quraish Shihab, *Tafsīr al-Mishbah*, vol. 3, 42.

¹⁹ Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam*, 107–15.

²⁰ Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam*, 107–15, 127–39.

²¹ Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 84–139.

Qur'ān 2:256: The Prohibition of Coercion and Religious Freedom

Qur'ān 2:256 declares *lā ikrāha fī al-dīn*. The verse does not state that all religions are theologically identical; rather, it separates claims of truth from coercion. Its assertion that right guidance has become distinct from error indicates that faith requires recognition and choice rather than compliance produced by threat. M. Quraish Shihab emphasizes that coercion cannot produce genuine conviction because religion concerns inward assent.²²

This distinction prevents two errors. The first is relativism, which assumes that the prohibition of coercion negates each religion's right to maintain its truth claims. The second is domination, which assumes that conviction of truth grants a right to compel others. The verse preserves space for theological commitment while establishing an ethical limit on how such commitment enters the social sphere.

Within citizenship, noncoercion must be understood more broadly than the prohibition on forcing someone to pronounce a confession of faith. Administrative pressure, discriminatory obstacles to building houses of worship, threats of job loss, compulsory religious education, or restrictions on legal status may function as indirect forms of coercion. Accordingly, *hifz al-dīn* cannot be understood merely as preserving the majority religion; it also requires conditions in which convictions may be practiced freely and responsibly.

This freedom is not absolute in the sense of permitting the deprivation of others' rights. Religious freedom operates together with security, legitimate public order, and civic responsibility. Yet restrictions must target demonstrably harmful actions rather than identity or belief. Kamali argues that freedom is an inherent right and that the state is obliged to provide guarantees for its protection, while equality and justice serve as criteria preventing the public interest from being invoked to abolish freedom arbitrarily.²³

Intergroup relations must therefore be distinguished across two connected domains. In the theological domain, each community may maintain and persuasively teach its truth claims. In the civic domain, such claims do not become a license to coerce, expel, obstruct worship, or restrict the legal rights of other citizens. Constitutionalism functions to ensure that public authority does not convert the theology of the majority into legal coercion over all citizens.²⁴

Intratextual Synthesis: Conflict, Nonaggression, and Citizenship

The synthesis of these verses shows that the Qur'ān does not establish a single rule for all non-Muslims. Qur'ān 4:144 and 60:1 regulate loyalty in circumstances of hypocrisy, threat, disclosure of secrets, expulsion, and hostility. Qur'ān 60:8–9 distinguishes aggressors from nonaggressors. Qur'ān 49:13 directs diversity toward recognition, while Qur'ān 5:8 establishes justice even toward groups that are disliked.

From this synthesis, interreligious relations may be formulated in three categories. First, in situations of aggression, cooperation that facilitates violence or betrayal must be prevented. Second, in conditions of treaty and nonaggression, benevolence, justice, and social cooperation are permissible. Third, under shared citizenship, all citizens are bound by the

²² M. Quraish Shihab, *Tafsīr al-Mishbah: Pesan, Kesan, dan Keserasian al-Qur'ān*, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2002), 551–55.

²³ Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam*, 12–28, 79–97.

²⁴ An-Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State*, 84–139.

same public law; loyalty is assessed through commitment to the constitution and collective security rather than religious identity alone.

This distinction also clarifies the relationship between means and ends. The prohibition concerning *awliyā'* in a particular context is a *wasīlah* for preventing security-related harm. Its ultimate end is not permanent separation between groups, but the protection of life, religious freedom, and justice. When a temporally conditioned means is transformed into a universal end, interpretation loses context and may produce forms of exclusion that other verses do not support.

This principle does not render conflict verses irrelevant. They remain applicable to acts of aggression, espionage, violence, or betrayal, including when committed by coreligionists. Conversely, religious difference does not automatically make a person an enemy. The moral criterion shifts from static identity to conduct, covenants, and their consequences for human rights and security.

Mapping the *Maqāṣid*: Protective and Productive Dimensions

The following mapping is not intended to attach *maqāṣid* categories after the interpretation has been completed. Each objective is derived from the structure of the verses and the social problem under analysis. The protective dimension addresses harms that must be prevented, while the productive dimension identifies social conditions that should be built.²⁵

In this study, *ḥifẓ al-dīn* does not mean preserving the dominance of one religion, but preventing coercion and guaranteeing space for worship. *Ḥifẓ al-naḥs* is derived from the prohibition of injustice, expulsion, and aggression. *Ḥifẓ al-'aql* follows from the need to read context, verify information, and prevent the manipulation of verses. *Ḥifẓ al-nasl* operates through preventing the intergenerational transmission of trauma and hatred.

Ḥifẓ al-māl is not stated directly in all of the primary verses, but it follows from civic justice, because religious discrimination often affects access to employment, services, and resources. *Ḥifẓ al-dawlah* concerns the prevention of betrayal and horizontal conflict, as well as the construction of an accountable constitutional state. By contrast, *ḥifẓ al-bī'ah* is not employed because the corpus provides no direct connection to environmental harm. The decision not to force every category into the analysis is itself part of the discipline of *maqāṣidī* exegesis.

<i>Maqṣad</i>	Qur'ānic Basis	Protective Dimension	Productive Dimension
<i>Ḥifẓ al-dīn</i>	Qur'ān 2:256; 60:8–9	Prevents religious coercion, intimidation, and attacks on places of worship	Guarantees religious freedom and equal public space for religious communities
<i>Ḥifẓ al-naḥs</i>	Qur'ān 5:8; 60:8–9	Prevents violence, expulsion, and punishment based on hatred	Builds security, solidarity, and legal protection
<i>Ḥifẓ al-'aql</i>	Contextual synthesis; principle of <i>tabayyun</i>	Prevents hate propaganda and the manipulation of verses	Develops religious literacy, verification, and critical dialogue
<i>Ḥifẓ al-nasl</i>	Qur'ān 49:13	Interrupts the intergenerational transmission of trauma and hostility	Builds inclusive education and just social memory

²⁵ Mustaqim, “Argumentasi Keniscayaan Tafsīr *Maqāṣidī*,” 39–41.

<i>Hifẓ al-māl</i>	Qur‘ān 5:8 as a principle of justice	Prevents deprivation and religion-based economic discrimination	Guarantees fair access to employment, services, and resources
<i>Hifẓ al-dawlah</i>	Qur‘ān 4:144; 60:1; 5:8	Prevents betrayal, horizontal conflict, and discriminatory policy	Builds an accountable and participatory constitutional state that protects all citizens

Table 2. Mapping the Protective and Productive *Maqāṣid*

Implications for Plural Citizenship

The first implication is a shift from tolerance to equal citizenship. Tolerance remains important as an interpersonal ethic because it prevents coercion and violence, yet conceptually it may preserve a vertical relationship: the dominant group becomes the party that grants space, while the minority receives the majority’s goodwill. Equal citizenship restructures this relationship by treating all persons as rights-bearing members whose entitlements do not depend on the benevolence of the majority. Civic relations therefore require legal certainty, access to public services, protection of houses of worship, economic opportunity, security, and nondiscriminatory political representation.

Studies of minorities in Indonesia show that formal recognition has not always been followed by equal access and protection.²⁶ This study deepens that scholarship by demonstrating that inequality should be read not only as a failure of policy but also as a hermeneutical problem. When conflict verses are generalized, inequality may acquire sacred legitimation. By contrast, the synthesis of Qur‘ān 60:8, 49:13, and 5:8 transforms equality from an external demand into an internal consequence of *birr*, *qist*, *ta’āruf*, and justice.

This position intersects with Andrew F. March’s argument that Islamic normative sources can sustain loyalty, recognition, and solidarity with non-Muslim citizens in a plural political order.²⁷ The contribution of the present study lies in its line of reasoning: equality is not constructed solely through political theory or the jurisprudence of citizenship, but derived from the intratextual relationship among verses on loyalty, nonaggression, diversity, and justice, and then mapped through protective and productive *maqāṣid*.

The second implication concerns leadership and public office. Qur‘ān 4:144 cannot be transferred directly into a universal prohibition against every non-Muslim leader, because *awliyā’* in its context concerns loyalty that abandons the community and opens the way to harm. Public office in the modern state is also not equivalent to personal patronage. Power is limited by law, terms of office, oversight, electoral procedures, and mechanisms of removal.

Assessment of public officials should therefore be grounded in competence, integrity, accountability, records of conduct, and loyalty to the constitution. Religious identity may shape a person’s ethical orientation, but it cannot replace scrutiny of capacity and behavior. The same standards must apply to Muslim officials: religious commonality does not remove the obligation to investigate corruption, abuse of power, discrimination, or betrayal of public

²⁶ Jati, “Relasi Antar Umat Mayoritas dan Minoritas,” 276–92; Wijayanti, “Kedudukan Etnis Tionghoa,” 139–48.

²⁷ Andrew F. March, *Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 163–276.

trust. This approach preserves the security concern of Qur‘ān 4:144 without turning it into identity-based politics of exclusion.

Kamali shows that juristic debates concerning officeholding and the rights of non-Muslims emerged under historical conditions different from those of the modern period, while contemporary relations based on covenant and citizenship require reconsideration of situational rules.²⁸ The present study reinforces that direction through the distinction between *wasīlah* and *ghāyah*: preventing harmful loyalty is the means, while secure, just, and competent government is the end.

The third implication is the protection of religious freedom. Qur‘ān 2:256, 60:8, and 5:8 require more than the absence of physical violence. The state and society are obliged to prevent expulsion, intimidation, discriminatory restrictions on worship, attacks on houses of worship, forced identity, and administrative obstacles lacking an objective basis. Religious freedom has personal, communal, and institutional dimensions.

Within a *maqāṣidī* framework, *ḥifẓ al-dīn* is not identical with maintaining the dominance of one religion. Protecting religion means preserving the possibility for human beings to believe consciously, practice worship, educate their communities, and participate in public life without fear of losing legal protection. At the same time, this freedom is limited by the rights of others and the prohibition of violence. Restrictions must be directed at harmful conduct rather than differing belief.

This argument is close to Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im’s view that constitutionalism and equal citizenship are necessary if religious norms are to live through voluntary conviction rather than state coercion. In his discussion of Indonesia, pluralism requires not only symbolic recognition but a state structure that enables every community to see itself as an equal part of the constitutional order.²⁹ This study adds a *maqāṣidī* exegetical basis by showing that noncoercion and justice result from a synthesis of verses rather than merely from the adoption of modern political categories.

The fourth implication is strengthening interpretive literacy as part of *ḥifẓ al-‘aql*. Polarization can be intensified when Qur‘ānic terms are detached from context, reduced to a single translation, and then used as labels for judging social opponents. Religious education must therefore distinguish the wording of a verse, its historical context, exegetical differences, moral values, and contemporary applications. This distinction does not weaken the authority of the Qur‘ān; it prevents the authority of revelation from being appropriated by a single untestable application.

In this context, *tabayyun* concerns more than fact-checking news. It includes verifying quotations of verses, the accuracy of translations, the relationship of one verse to another, the quality of reports concerning occasions of revelation, and claims that a particular opinion constitutes consensus.³⁰ Interpretive literacy must also teach distinctions among criticism, opposition, social tension, and aggression. Without such distinctions, political criticism may

²⁸ Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam*, 79–97.

²⁹ An-Na‘im, *Islam and the Secular State*, 84–139, 223–66.

³⁰ Aida Ayu Lestari and Eva Naria, “Tabayyun sebagai Etos Toleransi dan Moderasi *Ummatan Wasatan*,” *Al-I‘jaz: Jurnal Studi Al-Qur‘ān, Falsafah dan Keislaman* 4, no. 1 (2022): 83.

be branded as betrayal while violence by one's own group is protected in the name of solidarity.

The fifth implication concerns the governance of security. A contextual reading does not eliminate the relevance of conflict verses. The state remains obliged to prevent espionage, terrorism, expulsion, incitement to violence, and assistance to aggressors. Security measures, however, must be evidence-based, proportionate, reviewable, and must not treat an entire community as suspect. Collective suspicion risks producing alienation that deepens polarization.

Distinguishing identity from conduct provides a basis for just security. A coreligionist may betray the community, while a citizen of another religion may display constitutional loyalty. Security categories must therefore not be constructed through theological stereotypes. Qur'ān 5:8 serves as a controlling principle: even hatred and fear may not erase the standards of justice. Security that violates justice ultimately damages public trust and contradicts the maqṣad it claims to protect.

The sixth implication is a limitation on the concept of ḥifẓ al-dawlah. Protecting the state is not identical with protecting rulers, defending every policy, or eliminating criticism. The state is an institutional wasīlah for protecting religion, life, intellect, family, property, and dignity. Stability therefore cannot be made the highest end when purchased through discrimination, impunity, or restrictions on participation.

A political order is preserved through justice, participation, accountability, and the protection of all citizens. Peaceful criticism contributes to protecting the state because it helps expose deviations before they develop into greater harm. Kamali emphasizes that loyalty to state or community does not justify compromising justice, and that the appointment of public officials is a trust that must be based on competence.³¹ Accordingly, *ḥifẓ al-dawlah* must be read together with *ḥifẓ al-naḥs*, *al-'aql*, and *al-māl* rather than placed above them.

The seventh implication concerns economic equality and social services. Religious discrimination often appears not through explicit prohibitions but through obstacles to employment, business permits, education, social assistance, or access to resources. Qur'ān 5:8 demands justice that is visible in the distribution of benefits and burdens. *Ḥifẓ al-māl* in a plural society therefore includes preventing economic discrimination and providing effective grievance mechanisms.

Economic equality also strengthens cohesion. When a particular identity is consistently correlated with material disadvantage, difference can easily become a sense of injustice and polarization. By contrast, reliable public services enable citizens to experience the state as a shared institution. Productive maqāṣid in this respect do not stop at prohibiting the seizure of property, but build reasonable access to opportunity and social protection.

The eighth implication is the protection of generations and social memory. *Ḥifẓ al-nasl* does not concern only the biological continuity of families; it may also be applied, with appropriate limits, to preventing the transmission of trauma, stereotypes, and hostility. Historical and religious education should acknowledge violence suffered by different groups

³¹ Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam*, 107–15, 142–47.

without converting such memory into material for revenge. *Ta'āruf* requires a form of memory that enables people to understand the suffering of others.

This position extends studies of violence against minorities and sectarian conflict, which show that discrimination may be transmitted through labels, segregation, and the formation of group memory.³² The contribution of *maqāṣidī* exegesis is to offer a normative criterion: historical narratives should protect dignity, prevent the repetition of violence, and open possibilities for cooperation rather than permanently reinforcing fixed identities of victim and perpetrator.

In the Indonesian context, these implications allow Islamic identity and citizenship to coexist without canceling one another. Muslims may maintain their theological commitments, cultivate internal solidarity, and cooperate with citizens of other religions in public affairs. Non-Muslims are not positioned as objects of majority benevolence, but as legal subjects with equal rights and responsibilities. At the same time, every citizen—regardless of religion—may be held accountable for violence, betrayal, or violations of law.

This study therefore occupies an intersection between Qur'ānic exegesis and citizenship theory. Unlike research that primarily maps discrimination empirically, the article traces hermeneutical structures that may reinforce or correct it. Unlike citizenship theories that begin with abstract political principles, it builds its argument from interverse relations and the *maqāṣid*. Its findings support March's account of possible moral obligations toward non-Muslim citizens, An-Na'im's emphasis on equal constitutionalism, and Kamali's affirmation of universal Qur'ānic justice. The distinctive contribution of this study is to combine these insights within an exegetical model that differentiates aggression, nonaggression, and shared citizenship.³³

Conclusion

A *maqāṣidī* reading shows that Qur'ān 4:144 and 60:1 do not contain a universal prohibition on relations with all non-Muslims. The two verses regulate forms of loyalty that may endanger a community in situations of hypocrisy, hostility, expulsion, and disclosure of information. Qur'ān 60:8–9 provides an internal clarification that benevolence and justice remain commanded toward parties that do not engage in aggression. Qur'ān 49:13 and 5:8 provide broader principles for social life: diversity is directed toward *ta'āruf*, while justice may not be defeated by hatred. Muslim–non-Muslim relations in plural societies therefore cannot be adequately formulated as unilateral tolerance. They must move toward recognition, legal equality, religious freedom, security, and civic participation. From a *maqāṣidī* perspective, the synthesis yields six relevant objectives: the protection of religion, life, intellect, progeny, property, and the political order. Each has protective and productive dimensions. *Hifẓ al-bī'ah* is not forced into the analysis because the corpus examined bears no direct relation to environmental problems. This finding shows that applying *maqāṣidī* exegesis must begin with analysis of the verses rather than with a predetermined list of

³² Syafaah and Saumantri, “Memahami Kekerasan terhadap Kelompok Minoritas,” 10–18; Amal and Shodiq, “Konflik Sunnī–Shī'ah,” 208–37.

³³ March, *Islam and Liberal Citizenship*, 163–276; An-Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State*, 84–139, 223–66; Kamali, *Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam*, 79–97, 107–15.

maqāṣid appended afterward. This study is limited to library research. It has not empirically demonstrated how the verses are used in sermons, social media, fatwas, or political movements. Future research should examine the reception and deployment of these verses in public discourse and compare how majority and minority communities understand justice, loyalty, and citizenship.

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